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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DELL CHRYST, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
HANS BRAUN, KATHY GOULD, and 
WELTMEISTER, INC., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
CaseNo.20020738-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a directed verdict entered against Appellant, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did appellant properly preserve his claims in the trial court? 
Standard of Review: Where an appellant has not raised his claims in the trial 
court, nor "argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal . . . [an appellate 
court] need not reach [his claim]." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700-01 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial deny appellant's due process right by not allowing any 
party to give opening statements at bench trial? 
Standard of Review: Questions involving due process analysis are reviewed 
under a "correctness standard, which incorporates a clearly erroneous standard for review 
of subsidiary factual determinations." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n. 3 (Utah 
1991). 
Issue No. 3: Is Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) unconstitutional where it was 
clearly drafted to protect consumers and prospective employers from bad or unqualified 
employees? 
Standard of Review: "The issue of '[w]hether a statute is constitutional is a 
question of law, which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court.5" 
Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, \ 6, 52 P.3d 1148 (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are reproduced in 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
Utah Const, art. XII, § 19; 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 5, 2003, Appellant Dell Chryst ("Chryst") filed a verified Complaint 
against Weltmeister, Inc. ("Weltmeister") and two of its employees, Hans Braun 
("Braun") and Kathy Gould ("Gould"). R. 1-9. In his Complaint Chryst alleged that 
2 
Appellees, his former employers, committed the tort of slander and defamation against 
Chryst. See id. Further, admitting that the standard of review in the trial court was 
"clear and convincing evidence," Chryst alleged that because Appellees5 statements 
about him were false and made with actual malice, Appellees were not entitled to the 
good faith immunity and presumption afforded under Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001). 
See id. Appellees filed an Answer to the Complaint on August 19, 2003, asserting 
immunity as former employers under section 34-42-1. R. 15-19. 
A bench trial was held on December 13, 2004. R. 67, 112. Following Chryst's 
presentation of evidence, Appellees made a motion for directed verdict. R. 67, 112:145-
49. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing Chryst's case with prejudice. R. 67, 
112:149-52. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order were entered on 
January 27, 2005. R. 82-86. Chryst timely filed a Notice of Appeal on February 23, 
2005. R. 89-90. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
After processing Chryst's employment application and following an extensive 
background check conducted by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), the 
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), determined that 
Chiyst was not suitable for employment as an Immigrations Inspector. Plaintiffs Exhibit 
("P. Ex.") 17. In a "show cause" letter dated on December 18, 2002, the INS detailed 
Chryst's misconduct or negligence in employment and his criminal or dishonest conduct 
1
 The Facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. See State v. 
Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
3 
as the reasons for his non-hire. Id. Relying on that document, the trial court found that 
Chryst failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements about Chryst 
which were provided to OPM by Braun and Gould, were the cause of his non-hire. See 
R. 83-88. 
"k "k "k 
In March 2000, Weltmeister employed Chryst as a sales representative on a sales 
commission basis. R. 83-88, 112:10. Braun, a supervisor and Vice President of 
Weltmeister, hired Chryst. R. 112:7-8, 13. At that time, Chryst signed an employment 
agreement with Weltmeister. R. 112:9-10, 12-13, 120-21. Under the terms of that 
employment agreement, Chryst agreed not to "divulge any business information . . . 
including] . . . financial data . . . [and] sales data[.]" P. Ex. 1. 
Chryst became a higher paid fully salaried employee with no part of his salary to 
be derived from sales in July 2000. R. 83-88; P. Ex. 15 at 33. The reason for the 
increased salary was that Chryst agreed to work on an application for Weltmeister to 
become a publicly traded company. R. 112:13-15, 55-58; P. Ex. 15 at 33. Chryst was to 
spend the next three to four months working on only this application. Id. Chryst's 
employment with Weltmeister ended on or about July 31, 2001 under unfavorable 
circumstances. R. 83-88, 112:15-16; P. Ex. 15 at 35. 
During his employment with Weltmeister, Braun observed that after Chryst was 
placed on full salary his sales productivity fell to nothing. P. Ex. 15 at 33. Further, 
despite the three to four months that Chryst was supposed to have been working on the 
4 
application, Chryst failed to provide Braun with even a partially finished application. P. 
Ex. 15 at 33. When Chryst ended his employment with Weltmeister, he took all of his 
work files with him. P. Ex. 15 at 33. After Braun made a demand that he return those 
files, Chryst returned only four to five manila folders revealing the minimal work that 
Chryst had done over the last year and a half. R. 112:60-61; P. Ex. 15 at 33. Chryst was 
often observed spending a tremendous amount of personal time on the telephone and 
computer while at work. R. 112:124-25; P. Ex. 15 at 34, 36. Chryst would also leave 
work early when Braun was out of town and took unauthorized and unearned vacation 
time. R. 112:120-23; P. Ex. 15 at 36. 
Around the time he left Weltmeister, Chryst contacted the President of the 
company in Germany by email and informed him that Braun was embezzling money 
from the company and running the company into the ground. P. Ex. 15 at 34. The email 
further stated that Chryst sought Braun5 s position of Vice President. Id. Finally, in direct 
violation of the terms of his employment agreement, while working at Weltmeister 
Chryst contacted a mutual friend, Bruce Hall, and disclosed information regarding the 
company's finances and that Weltmeister was going under because Braun was bleeding 
money from the business. Id. Later, when he was interviewed by OPM, Mr. Hall 
confirmed Chryst's violations of his employment agreement. See P. Ex. 15 at 40-41. 
Following his employment with Weltmeister, Chryst unsuccessfully sought 
employment with IHC, the American Red Cross, several brokerage houses, City and 
State government and with private individuals. R. 112:48. In August 2002 Chryst 
5 
applied for employment with the INS. R. 112:48-49. As part of that hiring process, 
OPM conducted a background investigation on Chryst, interviewing Chryst, Braun, 
Gould, Mr. Hall and others to collect information about Chryst. R. 112:49; P. Ex. 15 at 
28-43. 
Throughout the course of its investigation, OPM discovered that three of the 
employees of Chryst5s former employer, Interstate Brands, refused to be interviewed due 
to unfavorable circumstances in which Chryst left that job, fearing that Chryst would sue 
them. R. 112:92-93. Chryst also sued Mr. and Ms. Hall and Interstate Brands, alleging 
that they are the cause of his failure to obtain employment with the INS. R. 112:88. 
On his application form ("SF 86") submitted to OPM, under oath Chryst was 
instructed to provide information regarding his employment for the last seven years. R. 
112:96; P. Ex. 15 at 13. However, Chryst failed to list his self-employment with Mass 
Mutual, his employment with SOS Staffing and his employment with Juab School 
District. R. 112:93-101, 103-04; P. Ex. 15 at 13-14, 55-59. Additionally, Chryst reported 
that he had received an Associate Degree from LDS Business College. R. 112:125. 
However, OPM discovered that this was not true—Chryst had not applied for graduation. 
Id, Despite having a second opportunity during his interview with OPM to correct or add 
that information on his SF 86, Chryst failed to do so. R. 112:101. Chryst certified by 
signature the SF 86, Declaration for Federal Employment, which states that his answers 
were true and correct and that false or fraudulent answers to any questions may be 
grounds for non-hire. R. 112:102-03; P. Ex. 15 at 24. 
6 
OPM also discovered that Chryst had filed three unemployment claims since 1994. 
R. 112:104. Prior to receiving unemployment benefits, Chryst had received a pamphlet 
from the State of Utah, Department of Workforce Services, containing instructions on 
reporting wages paid during periods of unemployment. R. 112:104-07; P. Ex. 15 at 54-
55. The pamphlet stated that it was illegal and fraudulent to receive unemployment 
benefits while not reporting wages paid during that time. R. 112:106-07, 109; P. Ex. 15 
at 54-55. Despite those express instructions from the Department of Workforce Services, 
OPM found that Chryst had failed to report substantial wages he had earned on two 
separate occasions while receiving unemployment benefits. R. 112:106-12; P. Ex. 15 at 
54. 
Based on OPM's investigative findings, the INS issued a show cause letter to 
Chryst dated December 18, 2002. R. 112:77-79, 129; P. Ex. 17. In that letter, the INS 
described the two charges or reasons why Chryst was being denied employment. Id. The 
first charge is labeled "Misconduct and Negligence in Employment." P. Ex. 17. It 
restates Chryst's misconduct and negligence based on negative information about 
Chryst's poor performance with Weltmeister, as primarily provided to OPM by Braun 
and Gould. Compare P. Ex. 17 with P. Ex. 15 at 32-36. However, the second charge 
entitled "Criminal or Dishonest Conduct[,]" is based solely on negative information 
obtained from Chryst's wage data and unemployment history sources. R. 112:111-12, 
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129; P. Ex. 17. The INS states in its letter that each of the two charges is a basis for 
disqualification from employment. P. Ex. 17. 
At bench trial, after the close of Chryst's case Appellees made a motion for 
directed verdict, arguing that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) Chryst had 
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements made by Braun and 
Gould were the cause of Chryst's non-hire. R. 112:145-46. Relying on the show cause 
letter detailing the INS' reasons for denial of employment, the trial court held that Chryst 
had not established by clear and convincing evidence the employer's actual malice or 
intent to mislead. R. 112:149-52. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
On appeal, Chryst claims that the trial court denied an alleged due process right to 
opening statements at bench trial, and that Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) 
unconstitutionally interferes with his alleged right to work where he wishes. Those 
claims fail because they are inadequately briefed, unpreserved, and lacking in merit. 
Chryst's arguments wholly fail to comply with the requirements of rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Combined, both of Chryst's arguments consist of two 
typewritten pages. Chryst makes no effort to cite portions of the record relied upon and 
to cite relevant comprehensible authority to support his claims. The two claims are also 
void of any substantive analysis. Additionally, Chryst's statements as to the case and 
facts contain no citation to the record and are full of extraneous facts and unfounded 
8 
emotional remarks. Where Chryst's brief is wholly inadequate, it need not be considered 
by this Court. 
Chryst's claims also fail in that they were not properly preserved in the trial court. 
At bench trial, Chryst's counsel did not object to the trail court's decision to forgo 
opening statements by any of the parties to the litigation. Further, Chryst's claim that 
section 34-42-1 is unconstitutional was never raised before the trial court. Given 
Chryst's failure to properly preserve his claims in the trial court and his failure to argue 
exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal, his claims are waived on appeal. 
Finally, neither of Chryst's claims have merit. Contrary to Chryst's assertion 
otherwise, the trial court's decision to forego opening statements at bench trial was not a 
violation of Chryst's due process rights. The due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution 
and Utah Constitution only grant an individual his day in court. Where Chryst was 
afforded a meaningful opportunity to submit relevant information and persuasive legal 
reasoning to the court, he had his day in court. Further, as none of the parties was 
allowed to present opening statements, the trial court's decision was not prejudicial to 
Chryst. 
Likewise, Chryst's assertion that section 34-42-1 unconstitutionally interferes with 
his right to work is nonsensical. While the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to 
obtain employment when possible, that right is not absolute. Section 34-42-1 offers 
protection to former employers who have been asked by a prospective employer about 
the former job performance of an applicant. The clear purpose behind the statue is to 
9 
encourage open and honest disclosure by former employers so that prospective employers 
and consumers may avoid the often-devastating affects of bad or unqualified employees. 
Thus, section 34-42-1 is constitutional in that it is a reasonable regulation correlated with 
the public's general welfare. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE WAS DENIED 
DUE PROCESS AND THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-
42-1 (2001) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARE 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED, UNPRESERVED AND 
LACKING IN MERIT 
Although difficult to discern, Chryst essentially raises two claims on appeal: (1) 
whether the trial court denied Chryst's due process rights by not allowing opening 
statements at bench trial; and (2) whether Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is 
unconstitutional. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-7, 9-11. Chryst's claims fail in that they are 
inadequately briefed, unpreserved, and wholly lacking in merit. 
A. Appellant's claims are inadequately briefed, and therefore, need not be 
considered by this Court. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998). The 
briefing requirements are found in rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 
24(a)(9) requires that "[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issues not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts 
of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "'[An appellate] court is not a 
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depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.'" Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, \ 42, 110 
P.3d 678 (citations omitted); see also Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, Tf 11, 26 P.3d 212 
(Although "some leeway" is granted a pro se litigant, "[An appellate court] will not 
assume his '"burden of argument and research."5) (Citations omitted). 
In the instant case, Chryst's argument is inadequately briefed. Completely lacking 
in substance, Chryst's first argument consists of only one typewritten paragraph, less than 
half of a page long, containing only five brief sentences. See Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. 
Contrary to the requirements of rule 24(a)(9), that argument is wholly void of any citation 
to the record, void of any grounds for reviewing issues not preserved in the trial court, 
and void of any comprehensible and authoritative citation to authorities and statutes. See 
id. The only alleged authority listed within Chryst's first argument is an obscure 
quotation containing an incoherent cite to "75 Am Jur 2d, Trial Sections 192 et seq. [sic]" 
Br. of Aplt. at 10. As it stands, that citation fails to satisfy the requirements of rule 
24(a)(9), it does not constitute controlling authority in this jurisdiction and it lends no 
credence to Chryst's claim that an opening statement is a right of due process. See State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) ("[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority."); see also Walker v. United States Gem, Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 
2
 See also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not 
like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs."). 
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1996) (declining to address issues when appellant's brief "wholly fail[s] to cite to the 
record or a single case in support of this contention"). 
Similarly, Chryst's second argument consists of three brief paragraphs, amounting 
to just over one page of typewritten material. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11. Cf. State v. 
Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, ffl[ 12-15, 47 P.3d 107 (finding a single-issue argument 
consisting of only six pages to be inadequately briefed). Like Chryst's first argument, it 
also fails to comply with the requirements of rule 24(a)(9) in that it is wholly lacking in 
substance and citation to the record, and also fails to list any grounds for reviewing issues 
not preserved in the trial court. See id.; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). While the second 
argument contains one reference to the challenged statute, no effort is made to discuss the 
trial court's application of that statute or its alleged unconstitutionality. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 10. The only other citation, listed as "The U.S. Constitution 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) 
[sic]" is apparently a reference to an unidentified ancient United States Supreme Court 
case that, as quoted, lends no substantive support to Chryst's claim that a Utah statute is 
unconstitutional. See id.; see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1998) ("'[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority 
cited[.]'") (citation omitted, alteration in original). 
Additionally, Chryst's Statement of Case and Statement of Facts are insufficient. 
Except for an occasional reference to trial exhibits, Chryst's statements are wholly 
lacking in citation to the record. See Br. of Aplt. at 6-9. Moreover, both statements are 
12 
inappropriately rife with emotional argument and facts not contained in the record. See 
id. 
Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the statement of 
the case "shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and 
its disposition in the court below[,]" and that the statement of facts be "relevant to the 
issues presented for review[.]" Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Most importantly, the rule 
requires that "[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record[.]" Id. "This court need not, and will not consider 
any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'I 
Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (declining to consider an appellant's factual 
allegations were they were either unsupported by the record or not properly cited); see 
alsoKoulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987) (disregarding 
sua sponte an appellant's brief where it was "filled with burdensome, emotional, 
immaterial and inaccurate argument," and "only a small proportion of authorities cited . . 
. b[ore] any resemblance to the propositions for which they [were] cited"). 
Contrary to the requirements of rule 24(a)(7), Chryst's Statement of the Case is 
completely void of any semblance of the procedural nature of the case and of the 
disposition of the case. Instead, Chryst inappropriately offers two typewritten pages of 
unsupported factual statements and emotional arguments that are generally absent from 
the trial transcript. Compare Br. of Aplt. at 6-7 with R. 112. For example, Chryst 
improperly offers his conjecture such as "if the court had listened in the case and allowed 
13 
for due process . . .[,]" and Chryst's emotional arguments such as "this trial was biased 
and unfair[,]" and Chryst's unwarranted personal attacks on opposing counsel such as 
"[t]his was never an issue with anyone but [opposing counsel] to discredit [Chryst] and 
the court was duped by it." Br. of Aplt. at 7. Unfortunately, those are only a few of the 
many egregious examples contained in Chryst's brief. See id. at 6-7. Likewise, Chryst's 
Statement of Facts contains unsupported and unfounded allegations and argument. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 8-9 (accusing Appellee of slander, gossip, malice and of making 
"ridiculous accusations" against Chryst). Accordingly, where Chryst fails to comply with 
the clear directive offered in rule 24(a)(7), this Court may decline consideration of 
Chryst's appeal. See Uckerman, 588 P.2d at 144; Koulis, 746 P.2d at 1184-85. 
In sum, Chryst impermissibly treats this Court as "ca depository in which [he] 
dump[s] the burden of argument and research.'" Brigham Young Univ., 2005 UT 19 at f^ 
42 (citations omitted). Furthermore, Chryst's stated facts wrongly lack any citation to the 
record and are "filled with burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate 
argument[.]" Koulis, 746 P.2d at 1184-85. Accordingly, where Chryst has inadequately 
briefed his appeal, this Court need not address it. See Parra, 972 P.2d at 926. 
B. Appellant waived his claims on appeal because he failed to preserve them in 
the trial court. 
The record clearly reflects that Chryst was represented by counsel at trial. See R. 
112:3. However, neither of Chryst's two appellate claims were raised by a timely 
objection before the trial court. See record generally. Furthermore, Chryst has not 
argued exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal. 
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"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1f 11, 10 P.3d 346. "A timely objection provides 
the trial court with can opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct 
it.5" State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Moreover, the 
objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error" 
complained of. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
There is no exception to the preservation rule "unless [an appellant] can 
demonstrate [on appeal] that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11 (citations omitted); see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) ("Th[e] [preservation] rule applies to all claims, including 
constitutional questions[.]"). Furthermore, where an appellant has not "argued plain error 
or exceptional circumstances on appeal. . . [an appellate court] need not consider his 
claim." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995). 
Chrysfs first claim that he was denied due process when the trial court dispensed 
with opening statements, was unpreserved in the trial court. As the bench trial in this 
matter began, after counsel for the parties had made appearances for the record, the judge 
informed all parties that he that he had "reviewed the file, and [] will dispense with 
opening statements[.]" R. 112:3. The trial judge then informed Chrysfs counsel, David 
Holds worth, that he may proceed with his first witness. Id. Without objection, Mr. 
Holdsworth stated "[v]ery good, your Honor. Thank you." Id. He then called Chryst to 
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testify. Id. The opening statement issue was not raised again throughout the remainder 
of the bench trial SeeR. 112. 
The second argument made by Chryst on appeal—that the "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard as stated in Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is unconstitutional—is 
nowhere to be found in the transcript of the bench trial. See R. 112. To the contrary, 
Chryst expressly recognized both in his verified Complaint and during trial that the "clear 
and convincing evidence" standard set forth in section 34-42-1 was the appropriate 
standard to be applied in this case. See R. 1-9, 112:146-47. Significantly, in responding 
to the motion for directed verdict, Mr. Holdsworth stated "[t]he standard, however, is to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the employer—or in this case the former 
employer acted with malice, or with intent to mislead." R. 112:146. Even after the trial 
court awarded directed verdict in favor of Appellees, Chryst failed to make any objection 
to the court's decision. See R. 112:149-52. 
On appeal, Chryst fails to argue either exceptional circumstances or plain error. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 9-11. As a result, given Chryst's failure to preserve his claims in the 
trial court, they have been waived on appeal and should be dismissed. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74 at H 11; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700-01. 
C. Appellant's claims that he was denied his right to due process and that Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is unconstitutional lack merit. 
Irrespective of Chryst's failure to adequately brief his claim and failure to properly 
preserve his claims in the trial court, both of Chryst's constitutional claims are frivolous. 
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(1) Where Appellant was given ample opportunity to be heard, the trial 
court did not violate his due process rights by forgoing opening 
statements at bench trial. 
Essentially, Chryst's first claim is that the trial court denied his due process right 
by not allowing him to present an opening statement. See Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. Although 
in his argument Chryst fails to name what constitutional due process rights are at issue, 
under his "Constitutional Provisions" heading Chryst refers to article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 
id. Additionally, Chryst offers no analysis differentiating between the two independent 
due process clauses and their attendant rights. See id. Irrespective of those deficiencies, 
where Chryst was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the bench trial, there 
was no violation of his due process rights under either the Utah Constitution or the 
United States Constitution. 
'"Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the 
due process guarantees contained in the . . . Fourteenth Amendment^ to the United States 
Constitution.'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1J11 n. 2, 52 P.3d 1158 (citations omitted). 
"Therefore, [an] analysis of questions concerning procedural due process under the due 
process provisions of the United States and Utah constitutions are also substantially the 
same." Id. 
"[NJotice and the opportunity to be 'heard' are frequently recited as the essential 
elements of due process." Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, ^  12, 
110 P.3d 706. "Yet, this does not always mean a party's voice must be orally transmitted 
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to the ear of a judge." Id. Instead, "a party must simply be afforded a meaningful 
opportunity to submit relevant information and persuasive legal reasoning to the court." 
Id. "The manner of communication may vary, so long as it is effective to the context of 
the adjudication." Id. In short, constitutionally a claimant is only guaranteed his day in 
court. See Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, % 38, 44 P.3d 63. 
Chryst had his day in court. At trial, Chryst was afforded the meaningful 
opportunity to provide relevant witnesses testimony, redirect testimony, documentary 
evidence and argument to the judge. See R. 112. Through extensive direct and redirect 
testimony, Chryst was personally given an opportunity to explain his claims to the judge. 
See R. 112:4-88, 130-38 (92 pages of the 150-page transcript consist of Chryst's direct 
and redirect testimony). Chryst's wife was also allowed to testify, giving her version of 
the events. See R. 112:139-44. During the course of the bench trial, Chryst submitted 
twenty-two multiage evidentiary documents in support of his claim. See R. 80, 112: 4-
88. Finally, Chryst was given ample opportunity to oppose the motion for directed 
verdict. See R. 112:146-48. In light of those "meaningful opportunities] to submit 
relevant information and persuasive legal reasoning to the court[,]" Chryst's due process 
rights were not violated by the trial court's refusal to entertain opening statements. 
Perez-Llamas, 2005 UT 18 at f 12; see also Miller, 2002 UT 6 at f 38 ("Th[e] 
constitutional right to a day in court is the 'right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to 
litigate a claim, seek relief, or defend one's rights.'") (citing Black's Law Dictionaiy, 402 
(7th ed. 1999)). 
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Additionally, the trial court's denial of all parties' opening statements is harmless. 
Just prior to dispensing with opening statements, the judge stated that he had "reviewed 
the file[.]" R. 112:3. That statement infers that the judge was already well apprised of 
Chryst's claims, and that he was ready to hear the evidence. It is well known that the 
information provided in an opening statement is not evidentiary in nature; it is only a 
snap shot of what the evidence will show. See State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 
1982) ("The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the [judge] of what [facts] 
counsel intends to prove[;] . . . [i]t is generally accepted that an opening statement should 
not be argumentative."). Therefore, where the judge was already well aware of Chryst's 
claims there was no harm in dispensing with opening statements. The case was not so 
complicated that an opening statement would have been imperative. See State v. Harry, 
873 P.2d 1149, 1154 (Utah App. 1994). Indeed, Chryst's Complaint consists of only one 
claim. 
In any event, assuming arguendo that that the court's decision to forgo opening 
statements was harmful, where no party was afforded the opportunity to give an opening 
statement, any possible harm was shared by all parties, not just by Chryst. Accordingly, 
at trial Chryst was treated the same as the Appellees, and no harm could have resulted 
from that equal treatment. 
More importantly, Chryst fails to cite any authority for the proposition that failure 
to make an opening statement is prejudicial, and actually, Utah case law suggests the 
opposite. In State v. Harry, this Court held that "[e]ven if we did determine that that trial 
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counsel forgot to deliver an opening statement, we would still conclude that such failure 
did not prejudice [his client]." Id. Although Harry dealt with counsel's decision not to 
give an opening statement, the lack of weight afforded an opening statement is clear from 
that case. See id. Thus, the trial court's decision to forgo opening statements was not 
incorrect and did not prejudice Chryst in the litigation of his claims. 
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 is constitutional in that it was reasonably 
drafted to protect consumers and prospective employers from bad or 
unqualified employees. 
Next, Chryst asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is unconstitutional as 
applied by the trial court. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11. Although his claim is disjointed, 
essentially Chryst is asserting that the trial court's application of section 34-42-1 
impermissibly interfered with his alleged constitutional right to work where he wishes. 
See id. Further, Chryst alleges that Appellees, as former employers, were allowed to 
"hid[e] behind the intent[] of [] section [34-42-1]" and "hamper civil rights[.]" See id. at 
10. Chryst fails to acknowledge, however, that the trial court found that he was factually 
the cause of his failure to obtain employment with the INS. His failure to take 
responsibility for his immoral, dishonest and illegal actions fatally undercuts Chryst's 
constitutional claim. Moreover, section 34-42-1 was clearly drafted to protect consumers 
and prospective employers from bad or unqualified employees, and therefore, is 
reasonably consistent with the common good of the public and constitutional. 
In determining whether a statute is constitutional, the Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized that the challenged statute is presumed constitutional, and any 
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reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Tindley v. Salt Lake 
City Sch. DisL, 2005 UT 30, Tf 11, 526 Utah Adv. Rep. 19; Anderson v. United Parcel 
Serv., 2004 UT 57, If 7, 96 P.3d 903. "The issue of '[wjhether a statute is constitutional 
is a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court.'" Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ^ 6, 52 P.3d 
1148 (citation omitted). 
Article XII, section 19 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[e]very person in 
this State shall be free to obtain employment whenever possible." Consistent with that 
provision, section 34-42-1 provides that "an employer who in good faith provides 
information about the job performance, professional conduct, or evaluation of a former . . 
. employee to a prospective employer of that employee, may not be held civilly liable for 
the disclosure or the consequences of providing information." Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 
(2001). Further, section 34-42-1 establishes a rebuttable presumption that the employer 
is acting in good faith unless there is showing by clear and convincing evidence that the 
employer disclosed the information with actual malice as defined in the statute. See id. 
Contrary to Chryst's assertion otherwise, nothing in the language of section 34-42-
1 prevents him from soliciting employment opportunities. See id. In fact, the statute 
contains no requirement that a prospective employer is required to speak to the job 
applicant's former employer about his or her prior job performance. Whether a 
prospective employer decides to speak with a job applicant's former employer is left to 
the prospective employer's discretion. The statute only encourages honesty by former 
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employers when that contact is made. Accordingly, where Chryst's freedom to obtain 
employment is not impinged by the language of section 34-42-1, it must be presumed 
constitutional. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at 111. 
Furthermore, Chryst forgets that his constitutional right to obtain employment is 
not absolute—Chryst is only entitled to obtain employment "whenever possible." Utah 
Const, art XII, § 19. Long ago, in State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952), while 
examining article XII, section 19 of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the constitutional right to obtain employment is limited by "reasonable regulations 
correlated with the general welfare." Id. at 563. The High Court held that those 
reasonable limitations include "the qualifications prerequisite to engaging in the 
professions, trades and many occupations; the regulation of hours, wages, safety and 
other controls necessary for the common good." Id. 
The language of section 34-42-1 indicates that it was reasonably designed for the 
purpose of protecting the public, including prospective employers, from the affects of bad 
or unqualified employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001). This purpose is 
reasonably necessary for the common good of the work force of the State of Utah and for 
consumers. See Packard, 250 P.2d at 563. Notwithstanding the excessive litigation and 
unemployment costs often associated with termination of a bad or unqualified employee, 
in the State of Utah, the overall financial costs of training and/or remedying the mistakes 
of unqualified or bad employees likely exceeds millions of dollars. Significantly, a 
mistake by a bad or unqualified employee may, in some instances, cost the life of an 
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innocent consumer. It is this problem that section 34-42-1 was clearly designed to 
remedy. Without the protections of that statute, when questioned by a prospective 
employer a former employer would either decline comment or issue false praises 
regarding a former employee's poor performance. Thus, section 34-42-1 is constitutional 
in that it is a "reasonable regulation[] correlated with the general welfare." Id. 
In reality, however, Chryst was his own bar to employment with the INS. 
Chryst's acts of deceitfully hiding employment activities (even when given a second 
chance to correct that information), of fraudulently collecting unemployment benefits 
while receiving unreported wages on two different occasions, of breaching an agreement 
by revealing confidential company information, of stealing company files, of spending 
company time on the telephone and computer for personal reasons, of maligning a 
supervisor to the company president, of negligently failing to achieve work objectives, 
and of dishonestly taking unauthorized vacation days and pay, were the reasons for his 
non-hire with the INS. See P. Ex. 17. In short, given his improprieties Chryst's 
employment with the INS was never a possibility. See Utah Const, art XII, § 19 ("Every 
person in this State shall be free to obtain employment wheneverpossible[.]") (emphasis 
added). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees request that the judgment of the trial court be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of August 2005. 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
JEFFREY ttOfc&AERE 
Attorneys for Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / ' day of August 2005, I served a copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. 
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Dell Chryst 
1282 Greasewood Drive 
RivertonUT 84065 
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tah Code Section Article I, Section 7 Page 1 of 1 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
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Article XII, Section 19. [Blacklisting forbidden.] 
Each person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever possible, and a person or 
rporation, or their agent, servant, or employee may not maliciously interfere with any person from 
tabling employment or enjoying employment already obtained from any other person or corporation. 
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tah Code Section 34-42-1 Page i of 1 
34-42-1. Employer references - Civil liability — Rebuttable presumption - Common law. 
(1) An employer who in good faith provides information about the job performance, professional 
nduct, or evaluation of a former or current employee to a prospective employer of that employee, at the 
quest of the prospective employer of that employee, may not be held civilly liable for the disclosure or the 
nsequences of providing the information. 
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that an employer is acting in good faith when the employer 
ovides information about the job performance, professional conduct, or evaluation of a former or current 
iployee to a prospective employer of that employee, at the request of the prospective employer of that 
lployee. 
(3) The presumption of good faith is rebuttable only upon showing by clear and convincing evidence that 
i employer disclosed the information with actual malice or with intent to mislead. 
(4) For purposes of this section "actual malice" means knowledge that the information was false or 
ddess disregard of whether the information was false. 
(5) This section does not alter any privileges that exist under common law. 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
'asseel by Congress June 13, J 866. Ratified July 9. 1868. 
Jote: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th amendment. 
ection 1. 
ill persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
Itates and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
mmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty7, or property, without 
lue process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Jection 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
lumber of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
Sectors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
)fficers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
wenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
3r other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
:itizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member 
of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held 
illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
^Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment. 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may refer to 
the addendum of the appellant 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the 
appellee may file a bnef in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall conform to 
the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the 
appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to parties Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant* and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
"the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc 
(e) References in briefs to the record References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 
11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover 
page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right comer and each separately numbered page(s) referred to 
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit 
numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected 
(f) Length of briefs Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not 
exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule In cases involving cross-
appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed 
the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders 
The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the 
issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 
50 pages in length The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief The 
appellant's second bnef shall not exceed 25 pages in length The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length which contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant's first brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, 
and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good 
cause shown 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, 
including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant 
or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs 
(I) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that 
party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An 
original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a reference either to the page of the 
brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited 
(j) Requirements and sanctions All briefs under this rule must be concise presented with accuracy, logically arranged with 
proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immatenal or scandalous matters Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stncken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer 
Advisory Committee Note Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held See In re Beesley, 883 
P2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) T o successfully appeal a trial 
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty , the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists '" ONEIDA/SLIC, v ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc , 872 
P2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App 1994) (alteration in onginal)(quoting West Valley City v Majestic Inv Co , 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App 1991)) See also State ex rel M S v Salata, 806 P 2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App 1991), Bell v Elder 782 
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App 1989), State v Moore, 802 P 2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App 1990) 
U1C ^ H 
Rule 24. Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropnate headings and in the order indicated 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties The list should be set out 
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references (a)(3) A table of authorities with 
cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the 
pages of the brief where they are cited 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority, and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent part of 
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule 
(a)(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first indicate bnefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged 
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding A party seeking to recover attorney=s fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph The addendum shall 
be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum is bound separately, the 
addendum shall contain a table of contents The addendum shall contain a copy of 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced 
verbatim in the brief, 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion, in all cases any court opinion of 
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service, and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the 
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction 
(b) Brief of the appellee The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule except that 
the appellee need not include 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant, or 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of 
supporting authority. 
ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
INS Administrative Center, Twin Cities 
1 Federal Drive, Room 400 
Fort Smiling, MN 55111-4055 
December 18, 2002 
CSN: 02968985 
S:\INS\SCL\7004 
Mr. Jeffrey Dell Chryst 
1078 Country Mile Dr. 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Dear Mr. Chryst: 
This show cause letter is in reference to your application for an Immigrations Inspector position 
with the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Under the 
authority of section 5.2 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) conducted a background investigation to determine your current 
suitability for employment in this position. 
A. SUITABILITY ISSUES 
The investigation revealed certain adverse information, allegations and incidents. Therefoie, under 
the provisions of 5 CFR 731, we determined you are ineligible for an appointment as an 
Immigrations Inspector, and you may be denied examination for, and appointment to, all, or 
specific, positions within the INS for a period of not more than one year from the date of our 
decision on the following grounds, individually or collectively: 
(1) Misconduct or negligence in employment 
(2) Criminal or dishonest conduct 
Each of these allegations is a basis for disqualification from employment and will be discussed 
separately. 
Charge 1 : Misconduct or Negligence in Employment 
• While employed with Weltmeister Incorporated, there were accounts of your misconduct and 
negligence in following the rules of employment. You took an unauthorized four days vacation, 
prior to quitting your job at Weltmeister in July of 2001. Also, you quit earlier than the two 
weeks notice. You stated reasons for leaving Weltmeister as being a future 50% reduction in pay 
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and a decrease in hours. 
• A second instance of misconduct while employed with Weltmeister, Inc. is when you cleaned 
out your desk at the time of separation from Weltmeister. You took with you company files that 
were not to be taken out of the office, a breech of your signed employment contract. Your 
employer then sent you a letter directing you to return the company files and you returned four or 
five manila envelopes of information. A main file and project of yours, however, was not returned 
when asked by the employer. Another letter was then sent, asking you to specifically send the file 
containing the application project you were to have been working on throughout your last months 
with Weltmeister. You returned this letter to your employer unopened and, as of August 2002, 
you have not returned the project file to Weltmeister. 
• An incident that shows your negligence while employed with Weltmeister is when you were 
instructed by your supervisor to follow up on some accounts after you had submitted your 
resignation from the company. You did not make one phone call to any of the accounts you were 
told to call and, therefore, you neglected to do what you were told by your supervisor. Also, 
coworkers and supervisors attested that you spent company time both on the telephone and on the 
computer for personal reasons. 
• You also showed neglect for the regulations of the company by sending a derogatory email about 
your supervisor to the boss of the company in Germany. You stated in this email that your 
supervisor was embezzling money and running the company into the ground. You also stated your 
interest in the position of your supervisor, the Vice President. 
Charge 2 : Criminal or Dishonest Conduct 
You have shown a pattern of dishonesty through the employment misconduct and negligence listed 
in the above charge, as well as the instances that follow: 
• On your Standard Form (SF) 86, certified true and correct by you on April 30, 2002, you were 
asked to list your employment activities, beginning with the present and working back seven years 
(to 1995). You listed only Weltmeister, Inc. and Wonderbread/Hostoss (Interstate Brands). You 
failed to disclose employment with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, at which you 
were employed from August 2001, to February 2002. You failed to list a second employer, SOS 
Staffing, at which you were employed from March of 1995, to October of 1999. You were 
followed up with a second PRSI on August 8, 2002, at which you stated a second time that you had 
no other employments between 7/1995 and the present. 
• There is information that shows your dishonesty in collection of unemployment benefits. You 
collected $266 per week from August 1999, to October 1999. During October, Interstate Brands 
(Hostess) claimed that you earned $110.00, which you did not report to the Department of 
Workforce Services. You also earned $3,151.00 in the months from July through September at 
Interstate Brands (Hostess), with the last payment being on August 28th, 1999. You began 
collecting unemployment benefits on August 14, 1999, and continued to collect $266 for the weeks 
ending August 21st and August 28th, while still employed and receiving pay. You received a 
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pamphlet from the Department of Workforce Services that stated on the front, "-Important- to 
ensure your ongoing eligibility, use this guide as needed. You will be held accountable for the 
information contained within. Keep it in a safe place." Within this pamphlet was a portion 
concerning fraudulent behavior. It stated that "examples of Fraud include failure to report 
earnings while filing..." By failing to report your earnings while filing for unemployment benefits, 
you were dishonest in your contract with the Department of Workforce Services. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The qualities of good judgment, honesty, trustworthiness, reliability, dependability, 
professionalism, and integrity are critical for the Immigrations Inspector position. It is important 
that persons who carry out the essential duties required of the position demonstrate that they 
possess these qualities to a high degree in both their personal and professional lives. The above 
information, allegations and incidents cast serious doubt on your suitability for this type of 
position. 
C. OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND 
You are being afforded the opportunity "to make any comments or provide any explanation or 
documentary evidence, including affidavits, to dispute these allegations. We will consider this 
information in reaching a determination as to your current suitability for employment in the 
competitive Federal service position sought. 
You are not required to answer this letter. However, if you do not reply or we do not otherwise 
hear from you within thirty (30) days from the date of our letter, the INS decision in your case will 
be final on the basis of information on hand without farther comment or explanation from you. 
Your reply should be sent to me at the following address: 
FIPC-SAS-INS 
PO Box 618 
Boyers,PA 16018-0618 
The information summarized under Part A-Suitability Issues is the only information, along with 
any response or documents you furnish, that will form the basis for INS' final decision. However, 
you may request a copy of the material relied upon in preparing this letter, if you believe you need 
this material in order to respond. You may submit a written request to the address shown above 
for the material within the 30-day response period. You may also fax your request for the material 
to (724) 794-9498. 
The authority to collect the information permitted by this letter is derived from one or more of the 
following: 
sections 5.2 and 5.3 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations; 
sections 1303 and 1304 of title 5, United States Code; 
sections 8(b), 8(c) and 9(c) of Executive Order 10450; 
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sections 2455 of title 42, United States Code; 
sections 1434 and 2585 of title 22, Umted States Code. 
Any new information you supply will be used along with that supplied previously and developed 
through investigation to determine your fitness for employment in the Federal service or for the 
other employment purposes, including a security clearance and an evaluation of qualifications, 
suitability, and loyalty to the United States. 
This information may be furnished to designated officers and employees of agencies and 
departments of the Federal government for employment purposes, including a security clearance 
determination, an access determination, and evaluation of qualifications, suitability, and loyalty to 
the United States Government, and a determination regarding qualifications or suitability for 
performing contractual service to the Federali government. The information may also be disclosed 
to any agency of the Federal government having oversight for review with regard to OPM 
activities, to the intelligence agencies of the Federal government, or to others having a bona fide 
reason as published in the Federal Register. 
/ \A^C^tt U- ^U^cu,^ 
%: Douglas C. Halvorson 
Director, Operations 
National Hiring Center 
